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In 
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of the 
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JOHN POTTER, DAVID B. POTTER, 
JENNIE I. POTTER, SAR,AH 
POTTER GIBBS, NETTIE POTTER 
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EDI1'H POT'rER DEWEY, 
Plaintiff~ and Respondent8., 
DR. W. H. GROVES LATTER-DAY 
RAINTS HOSPITAL, a Corporation, 
Defend~nt and Appellant, 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
This action was brought by the sole heirs of 
Jean Brown Potter, deceased, to recover damages 
for the death of their wife and mother while a 
'Patient at the hospital operated by appellant. The 
deceased, while a patient at the hospital, suffered 
a fall which broke her hip, and which caused her 
death shortly thereafter. It has been and is re-
spondents' theory that the fall was the result of 
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the appellant hospital's negligence in failing to 
properly guard deceased at a time when they knew 
or should have known the patient needed restraint. 
This theory is pleaded in Baragraphs 6 and 7 of the 
complaint (Tr. 2-3; Ab. 3-4) and stated in counsel's 
1opening statement to the jury. (Tr. 21-23). Judg-
ment was entered in favor of respondents and 
against the appellant hospital upon the verdict in 
the sum of $1,000.00 returned by the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant's 12th Assignment of Error and 
grounds 3, 4, 9 and 10 of their 13th Assignment 
question the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
a finding of negligence against the hospital. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT A FINDING OF NEGLIGENCE 
We submit that the evidence is more than ample 
in this regard. Mrs. Potter, the deceased, entered 
the hospital upon Febn1ary 16, 1939, suffered her 
fall upon February 20th and died upon February 
23rd. Prior to her fall she had been a very nerv-
:ous, restless patient. . At times she had been irra-
tional and out of her head, talking aimlessly and 
incoherently. Apparently the patient did not, upon 
occasion, know she was in a hospital at all. The 
daughter, Jennie, testified (Tr. 107; Ah. 17-18) in 
regard to her mother's mental condition: 
'·'She Would tell us: 'See, this beautiful 
new room in the hotel they moved me in.' 
The next time she would say, 'Oh, I don't 
like this room in this. hotel.' Then she 
would change her mind about it. One day 
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._) 
she was talking to 1ne, and then she started 
to laugh. She said, 'Oh, I thought we were 
down in Kress' shopping.' '' 
1\Irs. Potter's condition was well known to the 
appellant hospital, for the Clinical Record (Ex-
hibit A) shows the patient to be upon February 
17th "verv restless." This record for February 
18th includes notations by the nurse on duty, that 
the patient's "mind is much confused," that the 
patient was ''talking incoherently,'' that she was 
"very restless," that she was "irrational." Feb-
ruarv 19th shows these notations bv the nurses: 
''Extreme restlessness,'' •' still ve;.y restless,' • 
''patient is irrational," "very noisy and restless." 
February 20th reports the patient to be ''very much 
confused'' and her ''condition unchanged.'' 
The Clinical Hecord also shows that the patient 
did from time to time try to get out of bed. This 
Record for February 18th shows that the patient 
was "very restless- trying to get out of tent;" 
and during the night "irrational, tries to get 
out of bed." Upon the next day, February 
19th, the day before her fall, the Clinical Record 
shows that the patient succeeded in getting out of 
bed. The record notation shows: ''Patient out of 
bed.'' 
vVe submit that it takes no expert to draw the 
conclusion that a patient who is "irrational'' and 
"very much confused,'' and who "tries to get out 
of bed'' and who does get ''out of 1 bed,'' needs to 
be watched or guarded. The Supreme Court of 
Minnesota, speaking in a case involving a pneu-
mmlia patient who, during a temporary delirium, 
frll or jumped from a hospital window, states: 
"\iVhen a patient enters a hospital, know-
ing that the nu1nber of nurses is less than 
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4 
the number of patients, he may not ·expect 
constant attendance, but the patient is en-
titled to such reasonable attention as his 
safety may require. (Citing authorities). 
If the patient is temporarily bereft of 
reason, and is known by the hospital auth-
orities to be in danger of self-destruction, 
the authorities are in duty bound to use 
reasonable care to prevent such an act.'' 
Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessen-
verein, etc., 175 Northwestern 699. 
And in the instant case Mrs. Potter was watched 
and guarded until the night of her fall. Upon h,er 
admission to the hospital, upon the night of Feb-
ruary 16th, sideboards were placed upon her bed by 
the hospital. (Tr. 230; Clinical Record, Feb. 16). 
Upon the nights of February 17th, 18th and 19th 
a special nurse employed by the Potter family was 
in constant attendance to the deceased. ( Tr. 102; 
Ab. 17) . But upon the night of February 20ih no 
sideboards were in place and, at the suggestion of 
Rhoda Larsen, Supervisor of Nurses at the appel-
lant hospital, the services of the special nurse were 
dispensed with. Miss Larsen testified that she told 
members of the Potter family: 
"I told them, as far as their mother's con-
dition was concerned and the treatment she 
had to have could very easily be taken care 
of by the floor nurses." (Tr. 233; Ab. 50). 
It was upon this night, while totally unguarded, 
that Mrs. Potter .suffered her fall, breaking her hip. 
Pneumonia set in almost immediately and she died 
upon February 23rd. 
We repeat, that under these facts, it takes no 
expert to draw the conclw;;ion that Mrs. Potter 
should haYP be,en guarded in some manner. But 
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such testimony is helpful, and appears in the record. 
Miss Leona Felix, a witness for the appellant hos-
pital upon direct examination, in response to a 
question put by counsel for the hospital as to why 
she had placed a sideboard on Mrs. Potter's bed 
after the fall, answered in these words : 
Q. "And "·hy did you put the board on at 
all~ 
A. Well, it just seems like anything- any 
nurse would 'think, ,after g-etting· out, if 
they got out once, they would try it again .. 
Q. And that was the reason for putting 
it on J? 
A. Yes." {Tr. 284; inaccurately stated 
in Ab. 61). 
It will be remembered that prior to her fall 
Mrs. Potter had tried to get, and had been, out of 
bed upon several occasions. ''Any nurse ~would 
think, after getting out, if they got out once, they 
would try it again." This was the opinion of the 
appellant hospital's own expert. 
Compliance or 'non-compliance with1 the cus-
tomary methods in hospitals does not furnish a 
controlling te·st of negligence. 
''The generally accepted view is that cus-
tomary methods or 1conduct do not furnish 
a test which is conclusive or controlling 
on the question of negligence, or fix .a stan-
dard by which negligence is to be guaged. 
The standard of due care~ is such care as 
a prudent person would exercise under the 
circumstances of the particular case, and 
conformity to customary or usual conduct 
or methods cannot amount to more than a 
circumstance of the case in determining 
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whether due care ha.s been exercised. Ac-
cordingly, if the conduct pursued or the 
methods adopted in the particular case do 
not measure 'Up to the ordinary care which 
would he exercised by a prudent person 
under the circumstances, negligence may 
he found to exi~t notwithstanding such con-
duct or methods were in accordance with 
those customarily pursued or adopted. The 
reason lis that the usual mode of doing a 
particular thing may involve a lack of 
proper care . . . . . '' 
45 Corpus Juris 707, et seq. See also, 
Jenkins rv. Hooper Irr. Co. 13 Utah 100; 
44 Pac. 829. 
We submit that there was verv satisfactorv 
evidence of !negligence upon the pa~t of the ho; · 
pital. 
_\PPELLANT'S FAILURE TO PROPERIJY 
GUARD MRS. POTTER WAS 'l'HE PROX-
IMATE CAUSE OF HER DEATH. 
It is not denied by •appellant upon this appeal 
that Mrs. Botter died as a result of the iJ!.juries shl:' 
sustained in the fall occurring upon February 20th. 
However, under the heading of proximate cause, 
appellant in their 13th Assignment, grounds 5, 6, 
7 and 8, state that there is no evidence in the rec-
ord to show that even though the hospital had used 
ordinary care in the nursing of the deceased, still 
it would have been physically possible for the acci-
dent to have happened. To have offered evidence 
to negative this proposition would have been 
unique under the law of nPgligence. For example, 
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a mail is struck and killed by a railroad train run-
ning at excessive speed and without ligfuts. Hav-
ing proved that the active negligence of the rail-
road caused the deceased's death, would it be 
necessary to show that had the train been going 
slow and had been burning lights the accident would 
not have happened·? Emphatically not, although it 
is physically possible for a person to be killed by 
a slow moving, fully lighted train. 
And in the case at bar, although it is possible 
for any person in a bed to fall out and suffer in-
juries, still it is the most reasonable of all assump-
tions that had the deceased been properly guarded 
she would not have so fallen. E~xperience has 
tanght the layman that a fall from bed is an un-
usual occurrence and one that does not happen in 
th(; course of ordinary events. But every father 
and ey·ery n1other knows that small children are 
in danger of falling from bed and that cribs have 
guards (sideboards) to prevent such an occurrence. 
And every nurse knows that an irrational person 
trying to get out of bed is apt to £all and should be 
restrained. The testimony of the witness Felix, 
above quoted, bears this out. 
THE DECEASED'S CRITICAL CONDITION 
UPON HER ADMISSION TO THE HOS-
PITAL DOES NOT RELIEVE THE HOS-
PITAL OF ANY DUTY TO PROPERLY 
TREAT~ BUT ON THE CONTRARIY IN-
CREASES THE DEHREE OF CARE DUE 
THE PATIFJNT. 
The examination of Mrs. Potter upon her ad-
mission to the hospital revealed her to be a serious-
}~· ill patient but tha.t with proper treatment her 
condition could be improved. (Tr. 280; A b. 60). 
Her critical condition most certainly did not relieve 
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the hospital from any duty it owed the patient. Such 
a cruel rule would shame the law. This patient's 
physical condition and her advanced a~e required 
the hospital to exercise additional caution and vig-
ilance in treating her. 
45 Corpus Juris, 701. 
THE EVIDE,NCE IS OVERWHELMING THAT 
THE DECEASED FELL OUT OF BED. 
Appellant's first and second grounds of their 
13th Assignment and their 22nd Assignunent claim 
there was no evidence to show deceased fell out of 
bed. Sufficient answer to this claim is to quote 
from the record without further comment. 
The Clinical Record for February 21st at 
12 :20 A. ~L shows : 
''Talking- patient sitting on edge of bed 
with legs down - reached for the floor -
fell as nurse entered the room. Complains 
left hip paining - helped back to bed. 
Crying and complaining of pain.'' 
Dr. tT ohn Boorne, the examining physician of 
the hospital, in his report of the acCident (first 
page of Exhibit A. the Statistical and Summary 
Sheet), reports the accident thus: 
''Fell out of bed and broke hip. Soon 
after died of pneumonia.'' 
In his direct testimony Dr. Boorne made this 
-;tatement: 
Q. "And what did you have in mind by 
that description, 'fell out of bed~' 
A. I merely meant that she - well, fell 
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out of the bed on the floor.'' (Tr. 281 and 
not appearing· in Appellant's Abs.tract). 
And the "Titness Felix who witnessed the fall, 
thought the deceased fell out of bed for she t(:\sti-
fied: 
''After she fell out she was extren1ely 
restless and she did move around a great 
deal." (Tr. 28±; Ab. 61). 
And Doctors Richards and Llewellyn, em-
ployees of the hospital, told l\Iiss Jennie Potter 
that her mother had fallen out of bed for 'Miss 
Potter testified: 
Q. "Did they (the doctors) say at that 
time anything about any injury to your 
mother~ 
A. Yes, they told us about a fractured 
hip from falling out of bed, and they said 
they couldn't do anything." (Tr. 111~ Ab. 
19). 
Appellant's lOth Assignment complains of thf\ 
following question asked the witness, Jennie I. 
Potter: 
Q. ''What, if )anything, did you do by 
way of special nurse after the injury to 
your mother~'' (Tr. 115; Ab. 21). 
By the great weight of authority medical ex-
penses which have been paid by the beneficiaries 
of a deceased person arising from the fatal injury 
complained of are proper elements for recovery. 
17 Corpus Juris, 1338-9. 
However in this case we submit that this particular 
question is moot, the trial court having not sub-
mitted this element of damage to the jury for con-
:-;ideration. (Instruction No. 9; Ab. 78), And we 
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here call attention to the trial court's Instructions 
Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 as fully presenting and submit-
ting appellant's theory of the case to the jury con-
trary to appellant's contention in their 20th 
Assignment. 
UNDER THE UTAH WRONGFUL DEATH 
STATUTE THE PECUNIARY VALUE OF 
THE LOSS OF SOCIETY AND COM~ 
P ANIONSIDP AND LOS:S OFI SERVIC:b~S 
OF THE DECEASED TO HER BENEFI-
CIARIES IS A PROPER SUBJECT Ol!, IN-
QUIRY AND ELEJ\ifENT OF DAMAGE. 
The trial court in its Instruction No. 9 sub-
mitted to the jury the question of the pecuniary 
loss, if any, sustained by the surviving husband 
and children by way of loss of society and com-
panionship caused by the death of the mother; also 
the pecuniary loss, if any, sustained by the husband 
only through loss of services. Such a charge i~:-t 
proper and has long been the law of this State. In 
Evans v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 
37 Utah 431; 108 Pac. 638, 
this Court in upholding this proposition at page 
437 states: 
"'We think that, in connection with the 
evidence showing what the deceased has 
contributed to the family for support and 
maintenance, the wife and children may 
also show the affection the deceased en-
tertained for them, his disposition and de-
portment toward them, his counsel and ad-
vice, and his care and kindly solicitude for 
their welfare insofar as theRe things were 
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made effective by his acts, and that the 
jury may consider all these things in con-
nection with the evidence of the amount 
the deceased contributed for support, as 
aforesaid, in arriving at the amount which 
the widow and minor children shall receive 
as compensation for the injury sustained 
by them by reason of the death of the hus-
band and father.'' 
And again at page 440 says : 
"Whatever is allowed by the jury must 
be by way of pecuniary recompense for 
the loss sustained by the wife and minor 
children, and must be strictly limited (1) 
to what the evidence shows the deceased 
contributed, and thus would probably have 
continued to contribute to them in money 
or other means by way of support and as 
an accumulation to his estate: and (2) to 
the money value of the injury suffered by 
the wife and minor children by reason of 
the loss of the advice, comfort and society 
which they enjoyed prior to the death of 
the decease-d and which would have con-
tinued for their benefit. If the evidence 
is to the effect that the widow and minor 
children suffered no loss upon the first 
ground because the deceased provided 
neither money nor other means of support, 
they }:till may be entitled to something 
upon the second ground, because the so-
ciety of the deceased may have been a com-
fort and his advice of material assistance 
to them. Ag1ain, a wife and children may 
have lost little or nothing upon either or 
both grounds, and the jury should then 
compensate them only for what they have 
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lost, and, in case they have lost upon both 
grounds, they should receive compensation 
to the extent of their loss.'' 
Mrs. Potter for many, many years and up to 
the time of her last illness had been rendering real 
and tangible 8ervice to her husband. We quote 
from the testimony of the daughter : 
Q. "She didn't wait on your father? 
A. Yes, she waited on my father. 
Q. What did she do for him after Octo-
ber, 1938? 
A. She kept care of his clothes,, seeing 
that he was fed and dre·ssed, and he is quite 
a care." (Tr. 125; Ab. 24-5). 
In other words the testimony of the daughter 
Jennie above was to the effect that her mother 
kept house for her father up to the time of her 
death. Mr. Potter, the husband, being a semi-
invalid, no woman could render greater serviee. 
Such services, those usual to mothers and wive~, 
are of real pecuniary value difficult though it he 
to place an exact dollar and cents value upon them. 
No testimony was introduced, no claim was 
made, for any loss of services to the children and 
this element was not submitted to the jury. The 
element of loss of services was limited strictly to 
those suffered by the husband. 
The husband and all the children were deprived 
of the society and companionship of their mother 
hy her death. This loss represented a real pecun-
iary loss to them as much as is possible or usual 
in any case. The Potter family was a harmonious 
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and affectionate group. There was no diseord. We 
again quote from the testimony of the daughter: 
Q. '"What was your mother's ability as 
a housewife~ (Tr. 112; not in appellant's 
Abstract). 
A. She had always been an excellent 
housewife. 
Q. vVhat was the relationship between 
your father and mother so far as . being 
affectionate to each other~ (Tr. 113; Ab. 
19-20). 
A. Well, they have been married for 
fifty -three years and they have always 
been happy together. 
Q. And as to companionship~ 
A. Well, they were always together and 
they worked together in everything. There 
was no disharmony in our home at all. 
Q. And what had been the conduct and 
attitude of your mother toward her chil-
dren throughout her life and continuing 
on up to the time of her death 1 
A. \V ell, she was the grandest mother in 
the world, I think, and she had :always 
been just grand to us. She has worked 
with us at all times and helped us in every-
thing we have gone through.'' 
Appellant quotes at length from White v. 
Shipley, 48 Utah 496; 160 Pacific 441, as being 
applicable to the facts in the case at bar. ·We sub-
mit that the White case is clearly distinguishable 
and in no way affects the law as we have stated it. 
In the White ease the children of the deceas.ed were 
not named in the complaint as beneficiaries, were 
not parti~s to the :wtion, and the only mention of 
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them in the entire proceeding came upon cross 
examination and consisted only of the children's 
names, ages, Hnd addresses. And then tlie trial 
court instructed the jury that the loss of society 
of the deceased to these children was to be con-
sidered by them in assessing damages. This in-
1Struction was held to be error and we agree, rightly 
so. But the facts in the White case :are not those 
of the case at bar. In the instant case the children 
of Mrs. Potter are named as beneficiaries, are 
parties plaintiff in the action, and their relation-
ship with their mother w,as ver11 carefully brought 
out for the jttry' s consideration. The case at bar 
.is the usual one where los.s of society and pecun-
iary loss therefrom is shown to be a fact, not one 
where out of a clear sky the jury is allowed to 
speculate. 
Appellant places some emphasis upon the tes-
timony of Dr. Boorne to the effect that in his opin-
ion Mrs. Potter would never recover from her 
~1eart ailment. In this respect we call attention 
to the fact that Dr. Boorne carefully avoided stat-
1ng that Mrs. Potter was fatally ill. Quite on the 
contrary he testified that in his opinion her con-
dition could be made better. He stated it thus: 
"I thought her condition might be im-
proved inasmuch as she was suffering at 
the time from lack of food and water ... 
I knew we could improve the sta,te of her 
nutrition, which might improve her sense 
of well being . . . but I doubted that she 
would ever recover." (Tr. 281: Ab. 60). 
It is common knowledge that a person suffer-
Ing a heart attack seldom if ever completely re-
covers. But lack of complete recovery does not 
mean death and it is well to keep in miU:d that Mrs. 
Potter had suffered an attack similar to this one 
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during l\fay of the preceding vear and had re ... 
covered sufficiently to render further service to 
her husband and comfort to her children. err. 123; 
Ab. 24). 
A HOSPITAL IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE 
OF ITS SERVANTS R-ESULTING lN' 
DEATH OF A PAYING PATIENT, NOT-
·WITHSTANDING THAT HOSPITAL IS 
ORGANIZED AS A CHARITY AND GIVES 
CHARITABLE SERVICE. 
The above stated rule was laid down by this 
'Court in · 
Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial 
Hospital Ass'n, 89 Utah 222; 51 Pac. 
(2d) 229. 
And again upon second appeal in 
94 Utah 460; 78 Pac. (2d) 645. 
No reason exists to now change this rule for it is 
soundly based and, as stated by this Court, will 
soon carry the numerical weight of authority. New 
Hampshire follows the rule in their most recent 
decision, 
Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital, 9 
Atlantic (2d) 761, (1939). 
California has very recently adopted the rule as 
Ret out in the Sessions case. 
Silva v. Providence Hospital of Oakland, 
97 Pac. ( 2d) 798. 
England v. Hospital of the Good Samar-
itan, 97 Pac. (2d) 812. 
The Silva case is so similar to the case at bar boLl} 
upon the facts and the law that we ·wish to call 
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special attention to it. We quote from the second 
paragraph of the opinion: 
''The facts in the case are practically un-
disputed. Almost four years ago, while 
the plaintiff was a patient in the hospital 
and paying the amounts charged by it for 
the services rendered to her, she fell and 
fractured her hip by reason of the negli-
gence of the hospital nurse in failing to 
equip her bed with a side-board. The hos-
pital concedes the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to support the findings on the issues 
of negligence, but it challenges the find-
ings and conclusions of law upon a special 
defense of exemption from liability.'' 
Mter thoroughly examining the various 
authorities and theories concerned with the ques-
tion of liability of charitable organizations the 
California Court concludes to follow the Sessions 
cas.e and closes its opinion thus: 
''This (citing the Sessions case) is not only 
the modern view but the one required by 
every principle of common justice. As one 
Court has said: 'It is a _principle of law, 
as well as morals, that men must be just 
before they are generous.' 
Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass 'n, 191 
Ala. 572; 68 So. 12; L.R.A. 1915D, 
1167. 
The judgment is affirmed.'' 
Mrs. Potter, the deceased, was a paying 
patient. This fact was first admitted by the appel~ 
lant hospital in their original answer but later de~ 
nied. The facts concerned with the question of 
payment were presented by stipulation and ~he 
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trial court found, as a matter of law, that the de-
ceased was a paying patient and did not submit 
that matter to the jury. An examination of the 
transcript and exhibits clearly supports this find-
ing~ and we must urge the reading of the tran-
script from page 73 to page 89, inclusive, in order 
to present the stipulation on this matter fully. 
It is admitted by the pleadings and the stip-
ulation of the parties that the appellant hospital is 
a corporation of Utah engaged in the treatment, 
nursing and care of the g·eneral public for pay. 
(Tr. 2, 18; Ab. 2, 7). Also, that the Price First 
\V ard is a separate corporation. ( Tr. 19, 72; A h. 
8, 12). The deceased was a member of the Price 
First ·Ward and as such was admitted to the appel-
lant hm;;pital as what is designated as a Church 
case. (Tr. 21, 84). A charge for services rendered 
her was made in the sum of $55.30 by the hospital. 
(Tr. 89; Ab. 14). For payment of this sum the 
appellant hospital looked to the Price First "\Vard 
as admittedly was the custom. (Tr. 82). And upon 
!.larch 17, 1939, a payment of $10.00 was received 
by the hospital from Price First Ward. There is 
no merit in appellant's contention that this pay-
ment was not paid for the services rendered Mrs. 
Potter for Exhibit 1, the ledger account for Mrs. 
Potter, shows that the $10.00 was credited upon 
171Pr a,ccount mul the balance du,e was reduced from 
$55.30 to $45.30. The ledger account also contain~ 
the notation to ''Collect from: Ward,'' supporting 
respondent's proof that payment was expected 
from the Price First Ward for the s.ervices ren-
dered Mrs. Potter. The fact that but $10.00 of the 
total charges was collected does not affect the fact 
of consideration for the Court will not question 
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the adequacy of consideration. The rule as stated 
in 
13 Corpus Juris 365, is thus : 
"So long as it is something of real value 
in the eye of the law. whether or not the 
consideration is adequate to the promise 
is generally immaterial in the absence of 
fraud. The slightest consideration is 
sufficient to support the most onerous 
obligation; the inadequacy, as has been 
well said, is for the parties to consider at 
the time of making the agreement, and not 
for the court when it is sought to be en-
forced." 
The fact that the appellant hospital expected 
and did receive compensation for the services it 
rendered Mrs. Potter leaves no escape from th(\ 
proposition that the patient was a paying patient 
as far as the hospital was concerned. The charit-
able undertaking came entirely from the Price 
First \V ard. However, should a proper case arise 
in which the question of the liability of a hospital 
to a non-paying patient must be determined we 
.~ubmit that the rule of the Sessions case should 
be interpreted to include non-paying patients. In 
the Silva case (California), above cited, a single 
.Justice dissented from the prevailing opinion in 
which charitable institutions were held liable for 
negligent acts of their servants. We believe part 
of the dissenting opinion to be worthy of note: 
''I cannot agree with the prevailing opin-
ion for two principal reasons. In the first 
place, I challenge the test of exemption 
from liability based on the ability of the 
pati~nt to pay. A poor man is just as 
much entitled to good treatment at a 
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hospital as a rich one and is ju.st as much 
in need of it. Compare 
Robinson v. Pioche, 5 Cal. 460-1. '' 
(Italics ours). 
The Justice then bases his dissent upon the prop-
osition that charitable institutions should enjoy 
general immunity. 
And the Minnesota Court in the Mulliner cas.e, 
heretofore cited, indicates it does not wish to dis-
tinguish between paying and non-paying patients 
for this Court states: 
"In this case, the deceased paid for the 
services he expected would be rendered, 
but this may not be a controlling fact. We 
do not believe that a policy of irrespon-
sibility best suhserves the beneficient pur-
poses for which the hospital is. maintained. 
·we do not approve the public policy, which 
would require the widow and children of 
deceased rather than the corporation, to 
suffer the loss incurred through the fault 
of the corporation's employees, which 
would compel the persons damag'ed to con-
tribute the amount of their loss. to the 
purposes of even the most worthy cor-
poration. We are of the opinion that pub .. 
lic policy does not favor exemption from 
liability.'' 
West Virginia is emphatic in its position that 
t hPr~ shall he no penalty upon poverty, saying: 
"That such a hospital in its treatment of 
a rich patient shall be held to a greater 
degree of care than in its treatment of a 
pauper is not to be tolerated. Certain 
luxuries may be given the former which 
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the latter cannot get, and this for various 
reasons ; but the degree of protection from 
unskilled and careless nurses must be the 
same in both cases.'' 
Frantz Roberts v. Ohio Valley General 
Hospital, 12.7 S.E. 318; 42 A.L.R. 
968, citing 
Powers v. Massachusetts Homoeopathic 
Ho·spital, i109 Fed. 294; 65 :A.L.R. 
372. 
The many authorities cited by appellant to the 
·effect that non~pa.ying patients cannot recover for 
negligent acts of employees of a charitable insti-
tution are all from States which grant this. im-
munity in paying cases as well. We believe, there-
fore, that the reasoning of these cases is not 
',applicable to the facts of the case at bar and th~ 
rule laid down in the Sessions cas.e. Those States 
in which the rule of the Sessions case is established 
indicate or hold that there can be no distinction be-
tween a paying and a non-paying patient. The 
following cases are from those jurisdictions: 
·Alabama: 
Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass 'n, 191 Ala. 
572; 68 So. 4, 
(paying patient, hut other Courts consider lan-
guage of opinion all-inclusive). 
Alabama Baptist Hospital Board v. Car-
ter, 226 Ala. 109; 145 So. 443. 
Parrish v. Clark, 107 Fla. 598; 145 So. 848. 
South Florida R. R. Co. v. Price, 32 Fla. 
46; 10 Ro. 638. 
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Minnesota: 
Mulliner v. German EYang-elical Synod, 
144 Minn. 392; 175 N :W. 699. 
Geiger v. Sin1pson Methodist Episcopal 
Church, 17 4: :Jiinn. 389 ; 219 N. W. 463. 
Oklahoma: 
City of Shawnee v. Roush, 101 Okla. 60; 
223 Pac. 354, 
where the Court said exemptions of this kind were 
for the legislative and not the judicial branch of 
the government, citing the Tucker (Alabama) case) 
above. 
Sisters of the Sorrowful Mother v. Zeidler, 
183 Okla. 454; 82 Pac. (2d) 996. 
City of Pawhuska v. Black, 117 Okla. 
108; 244 Pac. 1114. 
As we have heretofore pointed out, California 
now adheres to the rule of the Sessions. case. But 
it is interesting to note that when the harsh rule 
limiting liability in that jurisdiction to cases involv-
ing neglient selection of nurses and employees 
was in effect" that such limited liability was a 
special defense which had to be both pleaded and 
proved by the charitable defendant. 
Lewis v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 
273 Pae. 580. 
The appe1lant in the instant case neither pleaded 
nor proved due care in its selection of employees. 
We submit that the record is free. of error and 
that the judgment should be affirmed. 
Re·spectfully submitted, 
T. D. LEWIS, 
DAVID T. LEWIS, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents 
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